Review – The 22 Immutable Laws Of Marketing

The 22 Immutable Laws Of Marketing: Violate Them At Your Own Risk

by Al Ries & Jack Trout, published 1993

The redundant and contradictory laws of marketing

The 22 Laws is a helpful quick-read book for those looking to dip their toe into the waters of marketing. It takes a high level approach to the strategy of marketing and is definitely a “how-to-do” not “what-to-do” title. As such, my goal in this write-up is to focus on the laws I found to be most reasonable and deserving of consideration, the combine several laws that seemed to be versions of one another or the same concept examined from different angles, and dropped a number of laws I thought were too crude to be of any use.

An abridged journal of immutable marketing laws

My abridged version of The 22 Laws is as follows:

  1. It’s better to be first than it is to be better
  2. If you can’t be first in an existing category, introduce a new one in which you can be first
  3. Target mindshare, not marketshare
  4. Perception is reality; focus on perception, not products
  5. Own an exclusive word or attribute; your product and a category keyword or attribute should be inseparable in people’s minds
  6. The only positions that count in the market are first and second, and second’s marketing strategy is dictated by first’s
  7. Marketing categories will continually bifurcate over time
  8. There is a temptation to extend brand equity to new product lines, which simply dilutes the brand and invites additional competition
  9. You must be willing to give up product line, target market or constant change in order to dominate a market
  10. Failure is to be expected and accepted
  11. Trends, not fads, are the key to long-term marketing success

Putting the 11 laws into practice

Hopefully each of the 11 abridged marketing laws above are self-explanatory. But even as simple as they are, each holds a wealth of additional implications.

Law 1 is related to the concept of competition and is tied to laws 3 and 4. If you are the first product into a market you will not only likely benefit from a first-mover advantage but, if done correctly, you will have positioned yourself to define the market. People form habits and tend to make up their mind once and then not change it. When you’re first into the market you have a fortress position within people’s minds that entrant firms must assault if they hope to dislodge you. People tend to remember those who did things first, not best. It is easier to entrench than dislodge.

This is why law 2 is important– you want to avoid being an entrant in the competitive landscape as much as you can. Much better to create a category where you are the only supplier at best, or force your competitors to be No. 2, 3, 4, etc. at worst. Once you’ve created a category you are first in, promote the category, not your brand.

Marketing is a deeply psychological enterprise, which is why laws 3-5 focus on the role perception and mental imagery play in good marketing practice. But the specific application of these psychological rules is once again strategic in nature– they are each about how you compete and limiting your competition. By owning a word or attribute, as law 5 suggests, you deny your competition the benefit of identifying their product with that word and you often get a halo effect as related words and benefits get associated with your product in the consumer’s mind as well. The most effective words are simple and benefit oriented.

Furthermore, your word should be exclusive and precise, and you should only have one. If you pick something like “quality” you haven’t said anything about your product, because everyone intends to create a product with quality. You haven’t differentiated. And if you try to pick “value and safety”, you’ll lose because you’re now competing with two opponents– the one which prides itself on value and the one which prides itself on safety. It’s harder to fight two people than one. And it should go without saying that, if available, you should always choose the most important word or attribute to focus on.

Law 6 is important to understanding the concept of relativity in marketing. Your marketing strategy should always take account of “which rung of the ladder” you’re on as certain claims and strategies won’t make sense or will sound inauthentic if given from the wrong place on the market share ladder. Further, it will never be appropriate to market as if you’re No. 1, when you’re No. 2. The advantage of No. 1 is telling everyone you’re the best. The advantage to No. 2 is telling people they have an alternative to No. 1.

Laws 7-9 deal with the concept of marketing focus, or concentrating your marketing strategy to a narrow band where you can actually be competitive. Category bifurcation is a natural process (eg., computers –> laptops vs. desktops; automobiles –> family sedans vs. economy compacts, etc.) in market evolution. Many firms make the mistake of trying to maintain leadership in all resulting markets as initial markets bifurcate, instead of sticking to the market they have an advantage in where their brand is trusted most.

Worse, they dilute their own brand by bifurcating their market themselves (eg., 7UP –> cherry 7UP vs. original 7UP). The market that 7UP made for itself as an “uncola” and the marketing strategy it followed to enable that success does not carry over to derivative products and it ends up just competing against itself. Sometimes, you simply expose yourself to more competition in the process as competitors mimic you and you further slice up a slice of the market.

This is why a successful marketing strategy entails “sacrifice”, either of product line, target market or the impetus to constantly change. Expanding product lines mean expanding competition. According to earlier marketing laws, a brand can’t mean everything or it means nothing. Expanding product lines under a brand means movement toward “meaning everything/nothing”.

Similarly, few products will appeal to everyone. Attempts to appeal to everyone usually result in appealing to no one. Focus on the target markets where your product has the strongest appeal and then dominate those markets. And when you have a marketing strategy that works and results in market dominance, leave it alone, don’t go out in search of a new market you might not dominate (while giving up your dominant position in the process!)

The eleventh law highlights the long-term nature of successful marketing strategies. Good marketing is about coming up with an angle or word that differentiates your product and then establishing a long-term marketing direction to maximize the idea or angle over time. This implies avoiding hype and the temptation to market your product as a fad and instead seek to create a trend, which is more enduring and has more competitive inertia making it harder for your opponents to fight.

The law of failure (10) is the one likely most forgotten and least appreciated. Failure will happen. Not every strategy will work out. In the event of a failure, it’s best to cut your losses early and change directions. At the same time, it’s critical to understand that the first several laws of marketing entail risk-taking (for example, being first at anything involves sticking your neck out) so occasional failure is part of the territory.

Review – The Big Picture: Money And Power In Hollywood

The Big Picture: Money and Power in Hollywood

by Edward Jay Epstein, published 2005

What the movie business was like in 1947

The central theme of “The Big Picture” is that the economics of the film industry and the profitability of Hollywood (both mechanistically and proportionally) have changed significantly from 1947 to the present day. By way of comparison, consider a few of the following starting statistics:

  • In 1947, the major film studios produced 500 films; in 2003, the six major studios produced 80 films
  • In 1947, 90M people out of a total population of 151M went to a theater each week in America at a cost of about $.40/ticket; in 2003, less than 12% of the population saw a movie in a given week
  • In 1947, 4.7B movie tickets were sold in America; in 2003, 1.57B were sold
  • In 1947, “feature films could be shot in less than a month, and some B films were shot in a week”; today, the average live action film takes over a year to produce and the average animated film takes 2-3 years to produce
  • In 1947, “virtually all [studio] films” made money, with the average cost of making a film at $732,000, and average net receipts of around $1.6M; in 2003, “a relatively good year, the six studios lost money on the worldwide theatrical release of most of their titles”

By 2003, the cost of producing the average film had risen to $63.8M. Although the dollar fell 7x from 1947-2003, the cost of producing a film rose 16x! Clearly, when the trend in film production is studied over time it is obvious that film production has become a substantially more capital-intensive business, it is a higher risk business (in terms of the chance and cost of failure) and it is substantially less profitable, at least in terms of theatrical release.

How and why did the economics of the film industry change, and how have film studios managed to stay in business today if their main product (theatrical film releases) are money losers on average? The answer consists of two elements: changing government regulations, and changing strategic dynamics.

Government intervention

The new studio system is the product of three government interventions. (The old one was a product of one– patents and intellectual property laws that caused movie studios to flee the Edison Trust on the East Coast, where the ET’s lawyers had a harder time pursuing patent infringement claims.)

  1. In 1948, the Justice Department issued a consent decree to the major film studios, “give up control over major retail outlets [the theater distribution system] or face the consequences of a criminal antitrust investigation”
  2. In 1970, the FCC passed the fin-syn rule on studios’ behalf, giving Hollywood an advantage over the networks in the syndication business, laying the seeds for and eventual studio takeover of the television network industry and the rise of the international, corporate media conglomerate business model
  3. In the 1990s, fin-syn was weakened and in 1995, abolished altogether by the FCC, allowing studios and networks to become part of vertically integrated conglomerates controlling production, distribution, stations, networks, cables, satellites and other means of TV transmission

A few other intervention-related items of note: the Nixon administration asked studios to portray drug users as menaces to society rather than victims of addiction, resulting in the start of perpetrators of crime frequently being depicted as drug users in film and television productions. Additionally, in 1997 Congress passed a law allowing studios to be paid through a formula for integrating antidrug messages into the plots of television series that were approved by White House Office of National Drug Control Policy.

Your tax dollars at work!

Disney changes the game

The second major change to the old studio production and profitability model was Walt Disney’s decision to focus on young children and families as the primary audience for his film and television productions. This strategy began with development of Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs, which began in 1934. Between 1937 and 1948, 400 million children’s tickets at an average cost of $.25 had been sold. The film was the first to gross over $100 million. It was also the first film to have a commercial soundtrack, the first film to have merchandising tie-ins and the first film with multiple licensable characters.

Disney’s strategic decision was brilliant– he created a niche market (children’s entertainment) that the other studios refused to enter. He had this new and growing market all to himself for a long period of time, during which he established his brand as essential and synonymous with family entertainment. He  and his successors pioneered the idea of film releases as simply the starting point in establishing a long-lived exploitable IP asset which could generate additional cash flows outside the box office through merchandising and licensing arrangements.

The way Hollywood works today

Today, the major movie studios have either been subsumed into massive, international corporate conglomerates, or else they’ve become one (like Disney). Movies are just one of their many businesses, and the role of the box office has dwindled. Many movies lose money at the box office. But this is okay because the corporate studios issue their content and IP across their other media (TV, merchandising, music, home entertainment products, etc.) to make back their money, and then some.

As one example of new studio economics, consider the film Gone in 60 Seconds— worldwide box office gross of $242M, $103.3M paid by Disney to produce the film, $23.2 for physical distribution into theaters (prints and insurance), $67.4M on worldwide advertising, $12.6M in residual fees, all in costs of $206.5M to get the film into the theater and to generate an audience to see the film. The theaters then kept $139.8M of the box office gross. Disney’s distribution arm (Buena Vista) collected $102.2M. Disney’s overhead of $17.2M for employee salaries in production, distribution and marketing and interest payments of $41.8M mean the film lost over $160M by 2003.

But that isn’t the end of the story for a film like Gone in 60 Seconds, as the film IP takes on a new life once it leaves the theatrical market and enters the world of home entertainment, where it is sold as a personal home library title, rented and licensed for syndication through major domestic and foreign TV and other media networks. For animated films (and some live action titles), there is also the opportunity to merchandise relevant IP and license the film’s IP as a movie tie-in for the products of other companies.

As can be seen from the numbers above, the two primary drivers of increased film production costs are related to the competitive aspects of film advertising and distribution and the end of the “chattel talent” system whereby studios essentially owned their stars and laborers (producers, directors and film crews), compared with the “star power” arrangements of today. According to the author,

In this new era, stars, not studios, reap the profit their brand names bring to a film.

One reason that advertising costs have risen is due to the fact that in the previous era, one admission got you in for multiple screenings and every moviegoer essentially watched every screening shown during their admission. Today, movie audiences are highly segmented. This means that studios have to “create” a new audience for each and every film, they can not count on a moviegoer purchasing a general admission ticket which will result in them watching all of their films. As one Sony marketing executive put it:

If we release twenty-eight films, we need to create twenty-eight different audiences which necessitates twenty-eight different marketing campaigns.

Additionally, the transformation of the film industry into a global market with simultaneous releases means higher advertising costs (no way to reuse promotional prints and media as films no longer have “rolling releases” across the country) and higher physical film production and distribution costs (every theater needs its own copy of the film which must be shipped there and back). And because the studios no longer “control” their talent and labor, they must be willing to pay top dollar for the name-brand stars that draw the biggest crowds.

However, the studios have also gotten savvier at advertising and cross-marketing in the age of ownership by global, corporate media conglomerates. Major Hollywood studios cross-promotionalize across their various media. A studio can get actors, directors, etc. to be interviewed on the corporate parent’s TV networks to promote an upcoming film. Corporate sponsors with TV rights for certain sports and national events can get additional advertising and exposure for the corp parents film studios as well.

Film studios have also learned how to leverage their promotional efforts through tie-in marketing and merchandising partnerships. In these relationships, a leveraged marketing and advertising budget results because your partners pay to promote your characters and content for you. For example,

[McDonald’s] invested more than $100M — four times Disney’s own advertising budget– in just one film, Monsters, Inc.

The clearinghouse system

Another essential element of the modern film business that must be understood is the “clearinghouse system.”

Studios now outsource the making and financing of most of their movies and television series to off-the-book corporations

Movies used to return almost all of their money in a year; now, revenue flows in over the lifetime of licensable rights, often lasting many decades.

When revenue flows in, it is the studio that decides (initially at least) who is entitled to what part of it, and when, and under what conditions

which works to the studios advantage because

the studios usually control the information on which the payments are based

Theaters, distribution and merchandising

Today’s theaters have three primary businesses: concessions vending, movie-exhibition, and corporate advertising. However, contrary to popular belief and news headlines, the box office is not the primary source of profits for theaters– the selling of refreshments is.

Theaters want a film with broad appeal so there are more people attending who will buy more refreshments. Additionally, they want films no longer than 128 minutes in length because every film which exceeds that limit causes them to lose a potential evening showing.

Film studios, meanwhile, simply want their films to succeed at the box office because there has historically been a connection between success at the box office and later success in the home entertainment market, which is much more profitable for them as studios end up with only 45-60% of the box office revenues on average.

Non-domestic box office and non-theatrical release have long been critical to the Hollywood model. As early as 1926, Hollywood studios represented 3/4 of European box office and 1/3 of Hollywood revenues came from Europe. In the 1950s, Hollywood film studios had a 30% share of European and Japanese box office which grew to 80% by 1990. American film studios seem to flagrantly violate the Greenwaldian strategic mantra of “compete locally”!

Paramount and Universal jointly control the largest overseas distributor, United International Pictures (UIP). Pay-per-view TV earned the six major studies $367M in 2003, a relatively modest sum of money despite the hype of the model. Other major sources of revenues in nontheatrical release are airline in-flight entertainment, hotel pay-per-view and US military theaters overseas. One of the benefits of television syndication of studio content is that almost all marketing expenses are paid by the broadcaster and the network.

Merchandising is another critical element of film studio profitability. For example, merchandising alone adds an estimated $500M profit to Disney’s bottom line each year.And The Lion King produced $1B in retail sales by itself. Streams of licensing revenues can enrich a studio’s clearinghouse for many decades.

Critical competitive dynamics of the film industry

It’s a well-known fact within the industry that “the date on which a film will open can make or break a movie.” Traditionally, the 9 months between September and May when school is in session promises only a fraction of the audience possible during the three months in the summer season. Studios must compete for a limited number of big-release slots and face a distinct “prisoner’s dilemma” strategic framework in which the refusal to cooperate in selecting movie release dates can result in massively diminished box office performance for each studio.

The studio whose film has the weaker appeal to the target audience has a strong incentive to change its slot, since if the NRG numbers prove correct, it stands to get a smaller share of a confused and cross-pressured audience and will probably fail.

A key competitive strategy for film studios is the creation of franchise films. Franchise films are more stable sources of revenue, because they’re more consistent performers at the box office and in the sell-through of the home entertainment market. Additionally, they ostensibly help to lower the costs of advertising and marketing because there is already a fan-base/audience in place which does not need convincing anew to see a franchise sequel film or buy related merchandise. Additionally, television and other syndication networks are willing to bid higher for franchise films because of their consistency and predictability.

One key to creating franchise films is close adherence to the “Midas formula.”

The Midas formula

Only a very few films account for the lion’s share of a studio’s earnings. The film’s that succeed most often and most extremely typically follow the “Midas formula”. Films which follow this lucrative formula have the following features:

  1. based on children’s stories, comic books, serials, cartoons or a theme-park ride
  2. child or adolescent protagonist
  3. fairy-tale like plot
  4. strictly platonic relationships
  5. appropriate for toy and game licensing
  6. a rating no more restrictive than PG-13
  7. end happily
  8. use digital animation
  9. cast actors who are not ranking stars (do not command gross-revenue shares)

The Disney empire is largely the result of Disney’s successors closely hewing to this formula. R-rated and live action films have far less chance to reach their break-even compared to films adhering to the Midas formula. In act, non-formula films have little, if any, possibility of becoming billion-dollar-club members.

Other facts and figures and final comments

First, a few stray facts and figures:

  • the average cost of American distribution in 2003 was $4.2M per film for the major studios, while independent films averaged $1.87M per film
  • the six major studios spent more than $1B in 2003 on film prints
  • in 2003, the average advertising expense per film was $34.8M, compared to 1947 when $60M was spent on distribution and advertising by ALL major film studios combined
  • in 1947, movies were America’s third largest retail business and the six major studios collectively earned $1.1B, or 95%, of all film “rentals” at the domestic box office
  • in 1947, there were 18,000 neighborhood theaters
  • in 1947, Clark Gable made less than $100,000 per film

Studios are moving away from physical film in favor of digital projections. This could save millions in distribution costs as there will be no more cost of producing, shipping, storing and retrieving prints from film exchanges all over the world.

A critical summary of the film studio business model from Richard Fox, a vice president at Warner Bros.:

The studios are basically distributors, banks and owners of intellectual copyrights.

Notes – Competition Demystified: Chapter 5

Reading notes to Competition Demystified, by Bruce Greenwald and Judd Kahn

Looking for competitive advantages through industry analysis

One way to approach competitive analysis is by critically examining two key measures of performance:

  • operating margins; most useful when comparing firms within an industry
  • return on invested capital; useful for comparing between industries and within

These ratios are both driven by operating profit so they should track one another; when they do not, changes in how the business is financed may be the cause.

As the authors state,

Though the entries on the income statement are the consequences, not the cause, of the differences in operations, they tell us where to look for explanations of superior performance.

Learning by example: the Wal-Mart (WMT) case study

The explanations for Wal-Mart’s success have been numerous and diverse:

  1. WMT was tough on its vendors
  2. WMT monopolized business in small towns
  3. WMT had superior management and business systems
  4. WMT operated in “cheaper” territories in the Southern US
  5. WMT obtained advantages through regional dominance

Let’s examine these claims in order.

The first explanation fails the sniff test because WMT in fact had a higher Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) than it’s competitors. Additionally, its gross profit margins did not increase as it grew larger, implying it was not getting better and better economies of scale with suppliers by buying in bulk.

And while Wal-Mart did manage to generate additional income from higher prices charged in monopoly markets, this advantage was more than offset by its policy of “everyday low prices” in more diverse markets where WMT did higher volumes.

Technologically, WMT was a buyer of logistics and distribution technologies, not a developer of them. Anything it used, its competitors could use as well. Managerially, WMT appeared to have no advantage when it expanded its retailing into hardware, drug and arts and crafts stores. Why would WMT’s superior management be effective at discount general merchandise retailing but not add additional value in these markets?

The fourth explanation fails because Wal-Mart’s opportunities for expansion in the home markets of the South were not very large. Much of Wal-Mart’s growth and success took place in larger markets outside the South.

Wal-Mart’s secret sauce was regional dominance

Competitive advantages occur in numerous, often complementary ways. In the case of WMT, the initial competitive advantage was centered around a concentrated, regional dominance. Though smaller than its competitor Kmart, by focusing on one local region WMT was able to create a number of other competitive advantages for itself, including local economies of scale, that were not available to its competitor:

  • lower inbound logistics due to density of Wal-Mart stores, distribution facilities and vendor warehouses
  • lower advertising costs due to concentration of stores and customer base in target markets
  • concentrated territories which allowed managers to spend more time visiting stores rather than traveling to and from

Looking at Wal-Mart’s activities within the relevant boundaries in which it competed, it was far larger than its competition.

Eventually, economic law won out and growth took its toll on WMT’s great business,

it was unable to replicate the most significant competitive advantage it enjoyed in these early years: local economies of scale combined with enough customer loyalty to make it difficult for competitors to cut into this base.

WMT’s margins and return on capital both began to fall during the 1980s as it began its aggressive growth into the national market. Until then, WMT enjoyed the absence of established competitors.

What could WMT have done if it wanted to grow but maintain its competitive advantages?

If it had wanted to replicate its early experience, Wal-Mart might have targeted a foreign country that was in the process of economic development but that had not yet attracted much attention from established retailers.

Lessons learned from the WMT case study

The WMT case study leaves several general impressions:

  1. Efficiency always matters
  2. Competitive advantages matter more
  3. Competitive advantages can enhance good management
  4. Competitive advantages need to be defended
Learning by example: the Coors case study

From 1945 to 1985, the brewing industry experienced significant consolidation due to the following factors:

  • demographic trends, as home beer consumption rose at the expense of tavern consumption
  • technological disruption, as the size of an efficient plant grew from 100,000 bbl/y to 5M bbl/y, leaving many smaller brewers in a position where they could not afford to keep up
  • advertising trends, as the advent of television meant national brewers could spread fixed advertising costs over a larger revenue base
  • growth in brands, the market segmentation of which did not lead to growth in consumption but did result in larger advertising burdens for smaller brewers
The organization of Coors business

Coors’ business operations were characterized by a few fundamental structures:

  1. vertical integration, Coors produced its own strain of barley, designed its own cans, had its own bottle supplier and even had its own source of water, none of which produced a meaningful cost advantage
  2. operated a single brewery, which required it to transport all its product to national markets at great cost rather than producing within each market and shortening transportation routes
  3. non-pasteurization, which led to shorter shelf life than its rivals, adding to spoilage costs
  4. a celebrity aura, which, like most product differentiation strategies, did not result in a meaningful premium charged for a barrel of Coors compared to its rivals
For Coors, geographic expansion brought with it higher costs and reduced competitive advantage as these business organization decisions interacted with the wider distribution network in unforeseen ways:
  • longer shipping distances from the central plant in Golden, CO, resulted in higher costs that could not be passed on to consumers
  • the smaller share of new local markets it expanded to meant it had to work with weaker wholesalers
  • higher marketing expenses were incurred as Coors tried to establish itself in new markets and then keep up with the efforts of AB and Miller
The net result was that Coors was “spending more to accomplish less.”

Why Coors expansion was so costly

First, although Anheuscher-Busch, the dominant firm in the brewing industry, spent almost three times as much in total on advertising compared to Coors, it spent $4/bbl less due an economy of scale derived from larger total beer output.

Second, Coors experienced higher distribution costs because distribution has a fixed regional component which allows firms with a larger local share of the market to drive shorter truck routes and utilize warehouse space more intensively.

Third, advertising costs are fixed on a regional basis. Again, the larger your share of the market in a given region, the lower your advertising costs per unit. Coors never held substantial market share in any of the national markets it expanded into.

If Coors had “gone local” (or rather, stayed local), all of its competitive disadvantages could’ve been turned into competitive advantages. Advertising expenses would’ve been concentrated on dominant markets instead of being spread across the country. Freight costs would’ve been considerably lower as it would not have been transporting product so many thousands of miles away from its central plant. With a larger share of the market it could’ve used stronger wholesalers who might have been willing to carry Coors exclusively because it was so popular in local markets.

Additionally, Coors sold its beer for less in its home regions, allowing it to win customers from its competitors by lowering prices, offering promotions and advertising more heavily. Expansion, when and if it occurred, should’ve worked from the periphery outward.

The Internet and competitive advantages

Greenwald and Kahn are skeptical of the virtues of combining the Internet with traditional competitive advantages:

The main sources of competitive advantages are customer captivity, production advantages and economies of scale, especially on a local level. None of them is readily compatible with Internet commerce, except in special circumstances. [emphasis added]

With the Internet,

competition is a click away,

and furthermore,

economies of scale entail substantial fixed costs that can then be spread over a large customer base

a state of affairs which often doesn’t exist with virtual, e-businesses.

The Internet is great for customers, but its value to businesses as a promoter of profits is questionable. The Internet doesn’t provide a strong barrier to entry because it is relatively inexpensive to set up an e-commerce subsidiary. Additionally, there are no easily discernible local boundaries to limit the territory  in which a firm competes which is another essential element of the economies of scale advantage.

In other words,

the information superhighway provided myriad on-ramps for anyone who wanted access.

Questions from the reading

  1. Greenwald and Kahn argue that management time is the scarcest resource any company has. Is this true? Why can’t companies solve this simply by hiring more managers and increasing the manager-employee ratio?
  2. In the case study with WMT, why couldn’t Kmart at least match WMT’s efforts in establishing critical infrastructure organization and technology and compete on that basis?
  3. What were the sources of WMT’s customer loyalty?
  4. Which publicly-listed firms have regional dominance as a specific strategy they follow? Do these companies’ financial performance seem to suggest they derive a competitive advantage from this strategy?
  5. In the case study with Coors, what were the industry conditions in beer brewing that made national competition more efficient than local competition?
  6. Standard Oil, another producer and distributor of “valuable liquids” was vertically integrated. Why was vertical integration beneficial in the oil industry but not in the brewing industry for Coors?