Warren Buffett & Sanborn Map: An Early Balance Sheet Play
- Buffett first got involved with Sanborn Map in 1958 because it represented a relative undervaluation compared to his then current holding in “Commonwealth”, even though he still thought “Commonwealth” was undervalued
- Beginning in 1958, it represented 25% of the partnerships assets and BLP was the largest shareholder which “has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation”
- By 1959, represented 35% of partnership assets
- Buffett recognized that the business operated in a “more or less monopolistic manner, with profits realized in every year accompanied by almost complete immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort”
- Sanborn faced a changing business environment which beginning in the 1950s which “amounted to an almost complete elimination of what had been sizable, stable earning power” (after-tax profits: 1930s, $500,000; late 1950s, <$100,000)
- Buffett estimated the reproduction value of Sanborn’s map assets at tens of millions of dollars
- In addition, Sanborn Map carried a valuable portfolio of marketable securities which it began accumulating in the 1930s
- Buffett: “Our bread and butter business is buying undervalued securities and selling when the undervaluation is corrected along with investment in special situations where the profit is dependent on corporate rather than market action”
- The margin of safety was based on the fact that the investment portfolio was worth far more than the company was selling for in the market
- Additionally, Buffett took a control position which gave him an added margin of safety
- Buffett made roughly a 50% profit, according to Roger Lowenstein
Warren Buffett & Dempster Mills: Control Investing And Asset Conversion In A Net-Net
- In 1962, BLP owned 70% of Dempster Mills’ shares (with another 10% controlled by associates), representing approximately 21% of partnership assets
- Buffett: “Control situations, along with work-outs, provide a means of insulating a portion of our portfolio from [general market overvaluation during a strong bull market]”
- Buffett: “When control is obtained, obviously what then becomes all-important is the value of assets”
- Buffett chose to value the partnerships shares based on a discounted estimate of what the assets would gather in a prompt sale (discounted liquidation value)
- Buffett originally hoped he could turn around the company with existing management; when this failed, he brought in Harry Bottle on the advice of Charlie Munger
- Bottle, at Buffett’s behest, proceeded to liquidate the balance sheet, converting assets from the manufacturing business (a poor business) into marketable securities, which BLP saw as a good business
- Buffett: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake”
- Buffett’s first purchases of DMM began in 1956 when it was a net-net trading at $18 with $72 in book value and $50 in NCAV per share; the company had had profitable operations in the past but was a break even at the time of purchase
- Buffett: “Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years… [due to] an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.”
- Harry Bottle’s effect:
- Reduced inventory by 75%, reducing carrying costs and risk of obsolescence
- Correspondingly freed up capital for investments in marketable securities
- Cut SG&A by 50%
- Cut factory overhead expenses by 25%
- Closed 5 unprofitable branches leaving the company with 3 profitable branches
- Eliminated production lines tying up capital but producing no profits
- Adjusted prices of repair parts to yield additional annual profits
- Buffett: “It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, while we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.”
- Other notes:
- In 1961, Buffett committed $1M to DMM (his biggest investment yet), buying the controlling interest and staking 20% of BLP’s assets in the process
- Sold the company as a going concern in 1963 for a $2.3M profit, nearly tripling his investment
- Bottle’s employment agreement was based on a percentage of profits
Harvard Business School: Nintendo’s Competitive Advantage In The Early Home Video Game World
- Prior to Nintendo’s dominance, the home video game market was led by Atari and suffered a number of boom-bust cycles where as much money was lost on the way down as was made on the way up
- The cost of video game consoles has been falling in real terms since the 1980s:
- 1977, Atari VCS $200, game cartridges $25-30 retail, $5-10 cost to mfger
- 1983, Commodore, Casio and Sharp game systems sold for around $200-350
- 1983, Nintendo launches Famicom system at $100 retail price (believed to be at or below cost), and had extracted a rock-bottom chip price of $8/chip by placing an order for 3M units
- Home video game systems were a growing market:
- 1982, 17% of US households had a video game system
- 1990, Nintendo Famicom/NES console was in 1 out of every 3 households in the US and Japan and home video games represented a $5B worldwide industry
- Nintendo’s development costs were up to $500,000 per title (Y100M) and marketing expenses were several hundred million yen
- Nintendo’s approach was to focus R&D on developing one or two hit titles per year rather than several minor successes
- Manufacturing of cartridges was subcontracted at a unit cost of $6-8, which then retailed for $40
- Part of Nintendo’s value was in hit franchises such as Super Mario Brothers (1985), the Legend of Zelda (1987) and Metroid (1987), the first two of which were developed by hit designer Shigeru Miyamoto
- Demand for games soon outstripped supply, so Nintendo allowed six firms to be licensed software makers, paying royalties of 20% of the $30 wholesale price per game:
- Namco
- Hudson (later acquired by Nintendo and brought in-house)
- Taito
- Konami
- Capcom
- Bandai
- By 1988, 50 licensees, who were also charged the 20% royalty rate and had to absorb Nintendo’s manufacturing costs
- Cumulative sales of Famicoms from 1983-1990 = 17M, Nintendo had gained 95% market share of 8-bit home video game market
- On average, Japanese consumers bought 12 games for every Famicom system purchased
- Nintendo, via Nintendo of America subsidiary, rolled out NES (Famicom) in the US in 1985 at $100/system
- NOA limited licensees to producing 5 NES titles per year; had to place orders for manufacture through NOA at a cost of $14/game cartridge which wholesaled for $30 and were then marked up an additional $15 at retail
- By 1991, 100 licensees with only 10% of software development in-house at Nintendo
- Nintendo began licensing Mario and other characters to TV shows, cereal packets, T-shirts, records and tapes, books, board games, toys and other media
- NOA’s highly targeted ad budget was about 2% of sales and promotional partners were utilized extensively
- WMT did not stock competing video game systems
- In 1989, NOA proposed creating a proprietary online network for its game consoles, allowing users to play games, trade stocks, do e-banking and other activities that would later become common place throughout the late 90s but which Nintendo itself failed to capitalize on with its own later systems repeatedly!
- 1989, Nintendo releases Game Boy handheld game console in Japan, retail price $100, games $20-25, designed to broaden the appeal of their systems (another strategy Nintendo would later utilize with the Wii)
- By 1992, 32M Game Boys shipped worldwide and consumers bought on average 3 games per year
- In 1991, Nintendo signed a consent decree with the FTC ending many of their dominant licensing, manufacturing and wholesaling/retailing practices, completely changing the economics of Nintendo’s business
A House Rises 